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CAN A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BE DEFECTIVELY
DESIGNED?-BROCHU v. ORTHO
PHARMACEUTICAL CORP.
It is well established that a manufacturer may be held liable for injuries
caused by a defectively designed product.' A product is defectively designed
1. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 131, at 157 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
KIMBLE & LESHER]; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Use and Abuse of Warnings]. See also Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir.
1976) (it is "beyond peradventure that an automobile manufacturer today has some legal
obligation to design and produce a reasonably crashworthy vehicle"). Id. at 735.
The seminal products liability case, Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), provided the impetus for modern design litigation.
Writing for the majority, Justice Traynor stated that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. Prevailing strict products liability doctrine is embodied in RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Section 402A pro-
vides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. At least 26 states have adopted RESTATEMENT § 402A, and others have imposed strict liabil-
ity without expressly adopting § 402A. KIMBLE & LESHER, supra, § 2, n.41 (citing cases).
Manufacturers have been held strictly liable under § 402A in cases in which (1) the defect oc-
curred in the manufacturing process; (2) the product design was unreasonably unsafe; and (3)
adequate warnings of known defects were not provided. Epstein, Products Liability: The
Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REV. 643, 648-49 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Search
for Middle Ground]. In manufacturing defect cases, the outcome may depend upon whether
the plaintiff's claim for relief is based upon a negligence theory or a strict liability theory. In
cases where the plaintiff alleges either a design defect or inadequate warning, however, many
courts and commentators have concluded that strict liability and negligence theories produce
identical results. See, e.g., Wade, On Product Design Defects and Their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. REV. 551, 552 (1980) (strict liability and negligence theories are in effect identical).
See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1969) (in failure to warn
cases, no difference exists between negligence standard under § 388 and strict liability standard
under § 402A); Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 55-56, 240
N.W.2d 303, 307 (1976) (under either theory, the question is one of risks weighed against utili-
ty).
Differences may arise, however, if contributory negligence is a factor in the case. Ortho
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if, although properly manufactured, it is unreasonably dangerous.' A
product is unreasonably dangerous if its risk of harm outweighs its utility.'
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 551-52 (Ind. App. 1979). Dean Prosser
has remarked that in a case against a manufacturer, "an honest estimate may very well be that
there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where
negligence does not." Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960).
Some courts have distinguished the theories, claiming that strict liability focuses on the
manufacturer's product, whereas negligence focuses on the manufacturer's conduct. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229
(1978). One commentator describes this distinction as "semantic gymnastics." Birnbaum, Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 601 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Unmasking the Test]. If
courts truly focus on the product, manufacturers will be liable regardless of their knowledge of
dangers involved in the use of the product. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 I11. 2d 26, 44,
402 N.E.2d 194, 203 (1980) (Moran, J., dissenting) (under strict liability, knowledge is not an
element in a failure to warn case). To date, with a few exceptions, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r
Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978), the weight of
authority holds manufacturers liable only for known or foreseeable dangers. See, e.g., Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974).
2. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(1). Although the Restatement uses the phrase,
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous," in this Note the terms "defect" and "unrea-
sonably dangerous" will be used interchangeably. There has been some confusion as to whether
their meaning is identical. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 829-32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade] (the Restatement intended not to im-
pose two separate requirements but rather only to ensure the viability of "unreasonably dan-
gerous"). The confusion stems from § 402A(l) and the accompanying explanation: "[tihe rule
stated in this section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unrea-
sonably dangerous. ... RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment i. Most authorities
construe the terms synonymously. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491
n.3, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.3 (1974); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REv. 855, 861 (1963).
Professor Wade explains that "[tihe only real problem is whether the product is
'unreasonably dangerous,' because 'defective condition,' if it is to be applied at all, depends on
that." Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14-15 (1965). But see
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 441-43 (1972) (plaintiff need only show that the product was defective because proof that
defect was also unreasonably dangerous "rings of negligence"). The confused state of design
litigation has caused one author to comment that "after fifteen years of decision making in the
products liability area, courts have not only failed to fashion a legally sound definition of
defect in design cases but have also failed in practice to separate conceptually the notions of
strict liability, negligence, warranty, and absolute liability." Unmasking the Test, supra note 1,
at 601.
3. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 814 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reflec-
tions on Defective Products]. The determinative question in a design defect case is whether the
product is unreasonably dangerous, Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 526, which is
inevitably resolved through risk-utility analysis. See Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the
Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 229 (1979)
(design defects impossible to evaluate without balancing risk and utility factors). Most courts
adhere to the view that design issues necessitate risk-utility balancing. See, e.g., Borel v.
[Vol. 31:247
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Despite expansion in the area of design litigation courts have refused to
evaluate the designs of drugs.' This refusal stems from an exception derived
from Comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
which categorizes drugs as unavoidably unsafe products.' Comment k has
been judicially interpreted as absolving manufacturers from liability for in-
juries caused by unavoidably unsafe products, provided that consumers are
adequately warned of the dangers inherent in the product's use.6 Thus, the
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1974) (Texas courts balance risks inherent in product use against its utility); Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 172-73, 386 A.2d 816, 826 (1978) (risk/utility analysis is
proper approach in deciding design defect cases).
The test for unreasonable danger as originally set out in the Restatement is "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment i. Although the "consumer's expectations" definition
retains some adherents, see, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool
Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 332, 230 N.W.2d 794, 799 (1975), most courts have rejected it, reasoning
that consumers' expectations are subsumed in the jury's deliberations when evaluating the pro-
duct's risks in light of its utility. See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844,
851 (Tex. 1979). One scholar explains that "[a]n attempt to determine the consumer's
reasonable expectations of safety concerning a technologically complex product may well be an
exercise in futility, for the consumers have at most only a generalized expectancy . . . that the
product will not harm him if he treats it with a reasonable amount of care." Reflections on
Defective Products, supra, at 823.
4. For a discussion of judicial reluctance to evaluate drug designs see Comment, The
Diminishing Role of Negligence in Manufacturers' Liability for Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs and
Cosmetics, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 102, 115 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Liability for Unavoidably
Unsafe Drugs]. There is one trial court decision which has held that an oral contraceptive
manufacturer could be strictly liable for injuries caused by use of its contraceptive. Oresman v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1175 (D.R.I. 1975). The Oresman court found that both
negligence in warning and defective design of the pills were questions of fact for the jury. Id.
at 1180. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
5. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir. 1969) ("comment k makes an
exception to the strict liability rule in the case of products characterized as 'unavoidably un-
safe' "). See generally Willig, The Comment k Character. A Conceptual Barrier to Strict
Liability, 29 MERCER L. REV. 545 (1978). Comment k explains:
Unavoidably Unsafe Products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. . . . Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment k (emphasis in original). See notes 19 & 32-46
and accompanying text infra.
6. Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 418, 433-34, 307 A.2d
449, 458 (1973). In Leibowitz, the Court stated:
Because of the desirability of permitting drugs of proven value to be marketed
despite known or suspected risks in said drugs, courts have uniformly held that "a
drug, properly tested, labeled with appropriate warnings, approved by the Food
and Drug Administration, and marketed properly under federal regulation, is, as a
matter of law, a reasonably safe product ....
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 324, 413 P.2d 400, 404 (1966)).
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issue in virtually all prescription drug litigation has been the adequacy of
manufacturers' warnings.7
In Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,8 however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a drug manufacturer may
be liable for injuries caused by a defectively designed drug, whether or not
the warnings were adequate.9 The Brochu decision represents the first case
in which a circuit court has permitted recovery from a drug manufacturer
predicated upon a claim of defective design. 0 On the basis of a medical
study reporting a risk associated with an oral contraceptive, the Brochu
court concluded that a jury could properly determine not only that the
manufacturer failed in its duty to warn of the risk, but also that the product
design was unreasonably dangerous. ' '
Because this novel holding departs from the traditional basis of recovery,
adequacy of warnings, it is first necessary to review the state of prescription
drug liability prior to Brochu. An examination of the Brochu court's design
defect rationale reveals that the holding is conceptually sound, and properly
applied to the facts of the case. Indeed, it is precisely the peculiar facts of
Brochu that obscure the difficulties that would be encountered in extending
the design defect theory to prescription drugs in general. Thus, notwithstand-
ing the ability of the court to properly apply the theory in the context of
the case, a further appraisal of the holding mandates the conclusion that its
extension is unwarranted and unnecessary.
THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRODUCT LIABILITY
Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires a deter-
mination of safety and efficacy before a drug can be marketed,' 2 even the
7. M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.0112] (rev. perm. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as DIXON]. There have been a few scattered decisions, however, holding a manufacturer liable
on grounds other than warnings. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d
Cir. 1973) (manufacturer recommended a drug for a use not approved by the FDA); Tin-
nerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir.
1969) (failure to adequately test a drug before marketing); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.,
251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (withholding adverse test data from the FDA).
8. 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981).
9. Id. at 655.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. 642 F.2d at 655, 659.
12. DIXON, supra note 7, § 9.01[1], at 9-5. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1976) (mandating a determination of safety and efficacy). This legislation was
prompted by the Thalidomide disaster that occurred in the late 1950's. See generally Note, The
Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 735, 754 (1980). Congress responded by strengthening the power of the Food and
Drug Administration and passing the controversial Harris-Kefauver Amendments. See Drug
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (now codified in various sections of 21
.U.S.C.). For a detailed analysis of the impact of the Harris-Kefauver Amendments, see S.
PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 AMENDMENTS (1974)
[Vol. 31:247
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most stringent testing procedures cannot eliminate all dangers in otherwise
useful drugs.' 3 The use of even the most beneficial drugs can result in
serious illness or death.' 4 But because of the therapeutic value of drugs, it is
axiomatic that drugs must be marketed and prescribed despite their inherent
risks.' 5 Hence, the term unavoidably unsafe has attached to drugs.' 6
Courts do not permit plaintiffs to recover simply because harm results
from the use of a drug.' 7 Absolute liability, it is feared, would stifle
(concluding that the deterrent effect on introduction of beneficial new drugs has cost more
lives than the heightened protection has saved).
13. KIMBLE & LESHER, supra note 1, § 375, at 394. A drug marketed today has undergone
three phases of tests, subsequent to preliminary tests on plants and animals. The first phase
constitutes testing on volunteers. The second requires tests on a limited and controlled number
of patients, and the third involves clinical research. Id. § 373, at 386-93. The average time
spent testing a drug is seven to ten years. Grabowski, The Impact of Regulation on Innova-
tion, 34 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 555 (1979). The average cost to the manufacturer to introduce
a new drug is estimated at $50 million dollars. This figure includes the cost of developing un-
successful drugs. Id. Despite thorough testing, not all dangers can be eliminated nor all adverse
reactions identified. See Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen
Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 745 (1980) (citing M. SILVERMAN & P.
LEE, PILLS, PROFITS AND POLITICS 266 (1974)) (estimating that between 20-30% of adverse
reactions are caused by unknown side effects). For this reason, one commentator describes the
drug market as the "ultimate laboratory" with the consumer as the "ultimate test subject."
Id. at 757. (citing W. WARDALL & L. LASAGNA, REGULATION AND DRUG DEVELOPMENT 146
(1975).
14. See, e.g., Brick v. Baines-Hines Pharmaceutical Co., 428 F. Supp. 496 (D.D.C. 1977)
(chronic administration of drug for tuberculosis caused death from liver damage); Fritz v.
Parke Davis & Co., 277 Minn. 210, 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967) (treatment for epilepsy caused
death).
15. Comment k illustrates:
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which
not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is in-
jected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the
marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the
unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment k.
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment k. See note 5 supra.
17. Courts repeatedly emphasize that manufacturers should not be absolute insurers of
their products. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968)
(imposition of absolute liability inappropriate); O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291
(8th Cir. 1967) (ethical drug manufacturers are not insurers of their products); Cudmore v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1003 (1967) (manufacturers not strictly liable). Dean Prosser suggests that imposition of ab-
solute liability for drug-caused injuries could very well have deterred the introduction of two of
the greatest "boons" to medicine, polio vaccine and cortisone. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 661 (4th ed. 1971).
Because courts reject absolute liability, they have logically refused to hold manufacturers
liable for harm caused by unforeseeable risks in drug products. See, e.g., O'Hare v. Merck &
Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291-92 (8th Cir. 1967) (recovery denied because evidence indicating an
adverse side effect was discovered after the injury occurred); Christofferson v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hosps., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79-80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971) (manufacturer cannot be
held liable for unforeseeable drug reactions); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 III. 2d 26,
33-35, 402 N.E.2d 194, 198-99 (1980) (affirmed remand of complaint because plaintiff failed to
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product innovation.' 8 Thus, for any product-related injury, strict liability is
imposed only if the product is deemed unreasonably dangerous.' 9 Accord-
ingly, Comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides that an unavoidably unsafe product, properly tested and manufac-
tured, and accompanied by proper warnings, is not unreasonably
dangerous. 20
Because of the apparent exception for prescription drugs carved out of
section 402A, the inadequacy of warnings provided by the manufacturer,
rather than a design defect, has served as the basis for recovery in nearly
every drug case." Courts in turn, have imposed strict warning requirements
allege knowledge of the risk); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548
(Ind. App. 1979) ("manufacturer cannot be required to warn of a risk unknown to science").
Only one court has held that a drug manufacturer could be liable for failure to warn regardless
of whether the danger was foreseeable. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 383-84,
549 P.2d 1099, 1108 (1976) (under strict liability rubric, the test is whether there was a duty to
warn assuming manufacturer's knowledge of dangerous propensities) (citing Phillips v. Kim-
wood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974)). Cf. Crocker v. Winthrop
Labs., Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1974) (manufacturer liable for an unforeseeable risk of
drug addiction because of express statement that Talwin was non-habit forming).
18. In Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 48-49, 588 P.2d 326, 34142 (Ct. App. 1978), the
plaintiff proposed that the drug manufacturers should be held absolutely liable for injuries
caused by new drugs. Id. The court rejected this suggestion, and remarked that:
there are two risks involved in the development of new drugs: (1) the risk that un-
foreseen, perhaps catastrophic, injuries will result because a new drug is used in
man too soon; and (2) the risk that needless human suffering and death will occur
because a beneficial drug is withheld from mankind too long. Absolute liability for
the adverse effects of drugs would enlarge the latter risk to unacceptable propor-
tions . ..
Id. See also Liability for Unavoidably Unsafe Drugs, supra note 4, at 110 (rejecting absolute
liability). But see Comment, Liability of Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
1526, 1545-46 (1972) (reactions from drugs that do not treat illnesses, such as oral contracep-
tives, should be compensated under absolute liability). This distinction has been expressly re-
jected by at least one court. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541,
545 (Ind. App. 1979) (rejected suggestions that Comment k does not apply to oral contracep-
tives because there is no dire need for them).
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A(l). See note 2 supra.
20. See note 5 supra.
21. DIXON, supra note 7, § 9.0111], at 9-4. Although the phrase "unreasonably dangerous
as marketed" is used by some courts to denote the drug warning issue, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), this phrase is
often loosely employed. Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 519-21. Some warnings
merely inform the physician of risks inherent in the product and do not reduce the level of
danger. Id. Recovery for inadequate warnings in these cases is akin to failure to comply with
informed consent. Id. This concept is explained in Borel v. Fibreboard Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973). In Borel, the court stated:
The failure to give adequate warnings in these circumstances renders the product
unreasonably dangerous. The rationale for this rule is that the user or consumer is
entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product's utility or benefits
justify exposing himself to the risk of harm. Thus, a true choice situation arises,
and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed
of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.
[Vol. 31:247
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on manufacturers.2 2 In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman,23 for ex-
ample, the court stated that a manufacturer is viewed as possessing the
knowledge of an expert, and must warn physicians" of all risks of which it
knows or should have known.2" The court added that this requirement in-
cludes a duty to warn physicians of all risks that are suspected, even if not
medically proven.26 Finally, the Chapman court rejected the defendant's
argument that FDA-approved oral contraceptive warnings are adequate as a
matter of law,27 finding that, although technically accurate, the warnings
Id. at 1089. Other warnings should reduce danger, for example, by informing physicians of
premonitory symptoms of disease. See, e.g., Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th
Cir. 1972) (failure to warn of premonitory symptom of blindness).
22. The trend has been to heighten the judicial standard of adequacy of warnings. DIXON,
supra note 7, § 9.01[2], at 9-2. For example, courts originally adhered to the "appreciable
number of persons test, so that manufacturers were not liable for hypersensitive and idiosyn-
cratic reactions. See, e.g., Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). More recently, however, courts have re-
jected this approach. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir. 1969)
(trial court erred in referring to "appreciable number of users" in jury instructions); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84-85 (8th Cir. 1966) (duty to warn small percentage of
users). Indeed, plaintiffs have recovered where the manufacturer breached its duty to warn of
extraordinarily remote risks. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977)
(failure to give adequate warning where the risk was one in three million); Stahlheber v.
American Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48, 58 (Mo. 1970) (failure to warn where risk was less
than one in one million).
23. 388 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. App. 1979).
24. Id. at 548. Prescription drug warnings are unique in that manufacturers need only warn
physicians, not consumers. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969). The
Basko court described the reasons for this exception.
In such cases the choice is essentially a medical one involving an assessment of the
medical risks in the light of the physician's knowledge of his patients' needs and
susceptibilities. Further it is difficult under such circumstances for the manufac-
turer, by label or direct communication, to reach the ultimate consumer with a
warning.
Id. (quoting Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)). The Physi-
cian's Desk Reference and the package insert are the primary means of disseminating informa-
tion concerning a product's medical peculiarities and instructions for use. DIXON, supra note 7,
§ 9.04, at 9-18. In a few instances, such as with the oral contraceptive, the FDA requires
manufacturers to advise consumers as well as physicians of risks associated with the product.
See 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1981). However, no reported opinion has imposed liability for failure
to adequately warn a consumer directly. Cf. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind. App. 1979) (would not retrospectively consider failure to warn the con-
sumer).
25. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 548. The court rejected the
notion that drug manufacturers should be held liable for unforeseeable dangers. Id. at 547-48.
See note 17 supra.
26. 388 N.E.2d at 554 n.10 (citing Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 385, 549 P.2d
1099, 1108 (1976)). Accord, Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 I11. App. 3d 540, 564, 390 N.E.2d
1214, 1231 (1st Dist. 1979) (manufacturer breaches its duty to warn if it withholds warnings
while waiting for what it considers sufficient proof of a cause/effect relationship).
27. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 554. Accord, Stevens v.
Parke Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973) (FDA
warning requirements are minimal); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375,
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may not have effectively communicated the serious nature of the risk.2"
This duty, the court held, rests solely upon the manufacturer.29
Although courts have allowed plaintiffs to demonstrate that FDA-
approved warnings may be inadequate, no court prior to Brochu had
recognized a plaintiff's assertion that an FDA-approved drug is
unreasonably dangerous as designed." The statement that drugs are
unavoidably unsafe, and therefore within the protection of Comment k, has
become almost tautological.' Some courts have rejected the design defect
398, 528 P.2d 522, 533-34 (1974) (FDA warning may not fully indicate the extent of the risk).
But c.f, Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383-84 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 567
F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (FDA approved warning creates a strong presumption of adequacy).
28. 388 N.E.2d at 554. See also Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 288-89, 282 A.2d 206,
220 (1971) (overpromotion of the drug may have diluted the warnings and rendered them inef-
fective).
29. 388 N.E.2d at 554. It should be noted that the Chapman court purported to apply a
§ 402A strict liability standard to the warnings issue. Id. The court acknowledged that it has
been a matter of some debate whether Comment k implies a strict liability or negligence warn-
ing standard, and whether there is any difference in result depending on which standard is ap-
plied. Id. at 549-52. The Chapman court's analysis revealed that the terminology could make a
difference if contributory negligence was an issue. Id. at 552 n.8. The court concluded that
although it chose to term its standard as one of strict liability, such a label would not alter the
outcome in the case. Id. at 552-53.
It is not apparent that a "stricter" warning requirement is applied under strict liability than
negligence. For instance, the court that applied perhaps the strictest warning stand-
ard-manufacturers must warn by the "most effective method,"-did so after concluding that
there was no difference between strict liability and negligence. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yar-
row, 408 F.2d 978, 992, 993 (8th Cir. 1969). Because use of the strict liability rubric appears to
apply a different duty to warn standard than negligence, however, one court expressly stated
that it was proper to submit to the jury only one set of instructions. Smith v. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 90-91, 273 N.W.2d 476, 480 (1979) (submitting both instructions
could have misled the jury). Accord, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d
541, 552 (Ind. App. 1979).
30. See note 4 supra.
31. See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1980)
(to recover under Comment k a plaintiff must prove a breach of duty to warn for a drug-
caused injury); Dalke v. Upjohn Co., 555 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1977) (unavoidably unsafe
products not defective or unreasonably dangerous if properly prepared and accompanied by
adequate directions and warnings); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425 (2d Cir.
1969) (Comment k suggests that a drug is not defective nor unreasonably dangerous if the
manufacturer provides adequate warning of the risks involved); Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
64 111. 2d 543, 551, 356 N.E.2d 779, 783 (1976) (Comment k indicates that adequacy of warn-
ing is central issue in drug cases); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 61, 423 N.Y.S.2d
95, 97 (1979) (warning is key in drug cases because prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe);
Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 94-95, 409 P.2d 904, 906 (1966) (Comment k applies to drugs
and therefore refused to apply § 402A).
An examination of the authorities cited above reveals that the "protection" Comment k has
traditionally afforded is from liability resulting from harm caused by dangers inherent in the
drug's design, not from liability for failure to warn properly. These cases also suggest that in-
adequate warnings, negligent manufacture, or failure to sufficiently test a drug before
marketing are the only bases for drug product liability. The Court in Basko v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969), sums up the prevailing interpretations of the Comment k im-
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theory by holding that, as a matter of law, an FDA-approved product is
not unreasonably dangerous.32 A few courts, however, have recognized that
Comment k does not exempt drug products from judicial scrutiny of their
design, stating that Comment k implies the use of a risk-utility balancing
test to determine whether a drug's presence on the market is justified.3
None of these courts, however, has found a drug to be defectively
designed.3
Gaston v. Hunter" illustrates the relaxed scrutiny afforded drug designs.
In Gaston, the plaintiff was treated with an experimental drug as an altern-
ative to a back operation. The treatment, however, resulted in severe com-
plications and further injuries. 6 The plaintiff's expert claimed that the drug
was defective because it not only lacked therapeutic value in alleviating
back problems, but contained highly dangerous substances." Describing
Comment k rules of liability as "more lenient" than other section 402A
rules," the appellate court summarily concluded that the potential benefits
of the drug outweighed its hazards.39 Accordingly, the Gaston court affirmed
pact: "Although the imposition of strict liability for the idiosyncratic side effects of a drug is
certainly not unthinkable, Comment k provides that such a drug is neither, 'defective' nor
,unreasonably dangerous' in the § 402A sense if the manufacturer gives an adequate warning
of the risks involved." Id. at 425. In a footnote, the court explained that the alternative, the
"not unthinkable" imposition of strict liability, would result in absolute liability. Id. at 425
n.11. Devoid from the court's analysis is any notion that a drug may be other than
unavoidably unsafe.
32. See McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 201, 241 N.W.2d 822, 828
(1976) (unless the manufacturer withheld information from the FDA, a drug approved by that
agency is not defectively designed as a matter of law); Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 324, 413
P.2d 400, 404 (1966) (Federal agency approval will not safeguard a drug where fraud or
culpable nondisclosure is proven); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super.
418, 433-34, 307 A.2d 449, 458 (1973) (absent impurity or inadequacy in labeling, FDA ap-
proved drug is reasonably safe as a matter of law).
33. Se Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (must deter-
mine whether on balance the benefits justify its use); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chap-
man, 388 N.E.2d 541, 545 (Ind. App. 1979) (public interest in availability of a drug must be
weighed against risks).
34. In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d at 545, the court had "no
difficulty" in finding oral contraceptives, specifically Ortho-Novum 2 mg., reasonably safe,
and therefore under the protection of Comment k. See also Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498
F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974) (Salk polio vaccine not unreasonably dangerous); Cudmore v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1003 (1967) (MER/29 not "unfit and unmerchantable" after weighing utility against potential
danger).
35. 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1978).
36. Id. at 38, 588 P.2d at 331. Because it was debated whether the physicians negligently
prescribed the drug or whether the toxic effect of the drug itself caused the injuries, the plain-
tiff sued the physicians and the manufacturer. Id.
37. Id. at 47, 588 P.2d at 340.
38. Id. at 46, 588 P.2d at 339.
39. Id. at 47, 588 P.2d at 340. Importantly, the court did not examine the actual benefits
of the drug. Instead, because the drug was experimental, the court only speculated as to the
potential benefits of the drug at the time of the injury, regardless of whether the benefits were
subsequently realized. Id.
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the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on strict liability for defective
design.
40
The approach in Gaston stands in stark contrast with that in Self v.
General Motors Corp.," a case involving the design of a product falling
outside the purview of Comment k. In Self, the gas tank of the plaintiff's
automobile ruptured and burst into flames when the car was rear-ended at a
high speed.'2 The plaintiff's expert alleged that the automobile was defec-
tively designed because the rupture would not have occurred had the tank
been located in the less damaged area beneath the floor of the car.' 3 The
defense countered that if all possible types of accidents were considered, the
proposed "redesign" would not improve safety." Furthermore, the gas
tank of the other auto involved in the crash, located beneath the floor of
the car, had also ruptured and burst into flames.' 5 Rather than examining
the merits of the arguments, the court held that the conflict in expert
testimony created a jury issue as to whether the plaintiff's auto was
unreasonably dangerous."
As illustrated by Self, courts customarily delegate the risk/utility balanc-
ing test to juries for resolution of design defect claims.' 7 In contrast, the
casual assessments of the risk and utility of allegedly defective drugs have
effectively prevented drug design defect claims from reaching the jury.'8
Comment k, courts have maintained, explains this disparity in treatment.' 9
Thus, until Brochu, Comment k had removed drugs from the otherwise
common adjudication of design issues.
FACTS AND REASONING OF BROCHU
In 1971, Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation (Ortho) was selling an oral
contraceptive, Ortho-Novum 2 mg. (Novum 2), that contained 100 mcg. of
estrogen. 0 Ortho was simultaneously marketing other oral contraceptives,
40. Id. at 46-47, 588 P.2d at 39-40. The court further concluded that the manufacturer had
properly instructed the physician on the proper use of the drug. Id.
41. 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974).
42. Id. at 4-5, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
43. Id. at 9, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
44. Id. The dissent queried: "what if the angle of the collision had been different or
Prior's vehicle had been a low-slung sports car that went beneath the rear bumper and struck
the area which plaintiff contends is the 'safe' area." Id. at 15-16, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 585 (Com-
pton, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 8-9, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
46. Id. at 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 578. The jury had rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs, but
the manufacturer was given a new trial due to prejudicial remarks concerning the amount of
insurance available to the defendant. Id. at 14, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
47. See notes 113-20 and accompanying text infra.
48. See cases cited in note 33 supra. In these cases, the risk-utility balancing test was given
cursory treatment at the appellate level, but was not submitted as a jury issue at trial.
49. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
50. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654 (1st Cir. 1981). Most oral
contraceptives contain two active ingredients, synthethic estrogen and progestogen. Id. at 654
n.l. Ortho-Novum 2 mg. (Novum 2) contained 2 mg. of progestogen. Id. at 654.
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including a pill that contained only 50 mcg. of estrogen, Ortho-Novum 1
mg. (Novum 1)." It was recognized that the estrogen in oral contraceptives
exposed users to an increased risk of stroke, and consequently, the FDA re-
quired manufacturers to warn of this risk.52 Moreover, a medical study
(Inman-Vessey Study)" published in 1970 suggested a positive correlation
between higher doses of estrogen in oral contraceptives and the risk of
stroke."'
Mrs. Brochu had been using Novum 2 for four years when a stroke
rendered her partially incapacitated." The Brochus brought suit against Or-
tho claiming that the oral contraceptive caused her injury. 6 Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that Novum 2 was unreasonably dangerous because lower
dose pills, such as Novum 1, which were less dangerous yet no less effective
in preventing pregnancy, were available." The plaintiffs also argued that
Ortho fraudulently withheld from physicians the information regarding the
link between the dosage level and the increased risk of stroke, or in any
event, failed in their duty to warn physicians of the possible link." The trial
judge instructed the jury on fraudulent misrepresentation, and section 402A
strict liability for failure to warn and defective design. 9 The jury returned a
verdict of $700,000 for Mrs. Brochu and her husband."
On appeal, Ortho claimed that it was erroneous as well as unprecedented
to submit the drug design issue to the jury.6' Ortho also argued that the
51. Id. at 654. Ortho also marketed pills containing 60 mcg. and 80 mcg. of estrogen. Id.
at 654 n.1.
52. The FDA-approved warnings given by Ortho to physicians stated that a statistical study
in Great Britain had found that the risk of thromboembolic disease was seven times higher for
"pill" users than non-users, and that a similar study in the United States had found the risk to
be 4.4 times greater for "pill" users. Brief for Appellee at 8, Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (lst Cir. 1981). The warnings accompanying Novum 2 were identical to
those for all other oral contraceptives on the market. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
642 F.2d at 658.
53. Inman, Vessey, Westerholm and Engelund, Thromboembolic Disease and the Steroidal
Content of Oral Contraceptives, A Report to the Committee on Safety of Drugs, 2 BRIT. MED.
J. 203 (1970).
54. 642 F.2d at 657.
55. The technical name for the stroke that Mrs. Brochu suffered is cerebral vascular acci-
dent, which occurs when a blood clot forms in an artery of the brain. Brief for Appellant at 1,
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981). This is a subcategory of
thromboembolism, which is the term sometimes referred to in other cases involving oral con-
traceptives.
56. 642 F.2d at 653.
57. Id. at 654. Both pills were about 99% effective in preventing pregnancy. Id. at 655 n.4.
In essence, plaintiff's claim was that there was no need to have the 100 mcg. pill on the
market. Id. at 654. There had been some evidence produced at trial that the higher dose pills
may have been more effective in preventing breakthrough bleeding. Id. at 655 n.4.
58. Id. at 653. The Brochu's had withdrawn their claims of negligence prior to submission
of the case to the jury. Id.
59. Id. at 660-62.
60. Id. at 653.
61. Id. at 653-54.
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evidence suggesting the dosage level link to stroke was insufficient to create
a duty to warn, and therefore, the FDA-approved warnings were adequate
as a matter of law. 62
In sustaining the verdict, the First Circuit held that submission of the
design defect issue to the jury was not improper. 3 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court relied upon Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6' which had
considered a strict liability action for defective design of a lawn mower. 65
Thibault held that "when an unreasonable danger could have been
eliminated without excessive cost or loss of product efficiency, liability may
attach even though the danger was obvious or there was adequate
warning." 66 The Brochu court reasoned that this holding was equally ap-
plicable to prescription drug products, and rejected the defendant's claim
that Comment k precluded scrutiny of drug design. 67 The court stated that
Comment k itself suggests a risk-benefit balancing test to determine whether
a drug is unreasonably dangerous. 6' Therefore, it was appropriate to hold
Ortho liable under section 402A for defective design9.6
The Brochu court also held that Ortho's failure to inform physicians of
the potentially higher risk of stroke associated with Novum 2 was sufficient
evidence upon which the jury could conclude that the warnings were not
"reasonable under the circumstances." 7" In analyzing the adequacy of warn-
ings issue, the court first rejected Ortho's claim that approval of the warn-
62. Id. at 657-58. Ortho also claimed that the trial court had erred in three other respects:
(1) the submission of the fraudulent misrepresentation issue to the jury was prejudicial; (2) the
judge failed to adequately answer a jury question on the issue of damages; and (3) the charge
to the jury improperly intermixed negligence and strict liability concepts. Id. at 653-54. The
Brochu court rejected all claims of error. Id. at 661-63. In regard to the latter claim, Ortho
specifically objected to the instruction that a manufacturer may be liable despite "all possible
care." Brief for Appellant at 22, Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1981). The Brochu court conceded that the instructions were not "a model of clarity," but
emphasized that this instruction was proper with respect to the design defect claim. 642 F.2d at
661.
63. Id. at 655. The First Circuit was interpreting New Hampshire law. Id. Although New
Hampshire courts had not previously ruled on the issue, the Brochu court explained that it
believed that New Hampshire would apply the design defect theory to drug products. Id.
64. 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
65. Id. The Thibault court ultimately affirmed a jury verdict for the defendant manufac-
turer. Id. at 814, 395 A.2d at 850.
66. 118 N.H. at 808, 395 A.2d at 847.
67. 642 F.2d at 655, 657.
68. 642 F.2d at 657 (citing Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)). The Reyes court stated that a drug should not be marketed
"if the potential harmful effects of the product-both qualitative and quantitative-outweigh
the legitimate public interest in its availability." 498 F.2d at 1274. See notes 33-34 and accom-
panying text supra.
69. 642 F.2d at 655. Because Ortho challenged only the legal grounds of the design defect
claim, it was not necessary for the court to review the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
claim. Id. at 657-58.
70. Id. at 657-58.
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ings by the FDA established their adequacy as a matter of law." The court
further determined that a duty to warn arises when "a seller . . . has reason
to believe that danger may result from a particular use of his product..""
Thus, the plaintiffs were not required to demonstrate that Novum 2 actually
presented an increased risk of stroke. Rather, they needed to demonstrate
only a sufficient possibility that the risk existed. 3
ANALYSIS OF THE DESIGN DEFECT HOLDING
Although Brochu represents the first decision in which an appellate court
has applied the design defect theory to drugs," ' the holding that a drug may
be unreasonably dangerous regardless of whether warnings are adequate is
not conceptually startling. As with any product, the utility of a drug may
not always justify the potential harm that results from its use.7" Alternative
drugs, as Brochu illustrates, may perform the same therapeutic task while
posing less risk of injury. Thus, the court's perception that Comment k ex-
empts a drug from section 402A rules of strict liability only if its benefits
exceed its risks is conceptually sound.
The court further reasoned that it is logical to submit a case to the jury
on both design defect and adequacy of -warnings grounds, stating that "if
proper warnings would result in nonmarketability of the product, then the
71. Id. at 658. See note 27 supra.
72. 642 F.2d at 657 (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)).
73. 642 F.2d at 659. The court noted that Ortho's own Adverse Reaction Reports indicated
that there might have existed a higher risk associated with higher estrogen doses. Id. at 658
n.13. Additionally, the warnings that accompanied Novum 2 informed physicians of other risks
that were not medically proven. Id. at 659 n.14. This prompted the court to remark that "[tihe
standard actually followed for inclusion [in the warnings] appears to have been considerably
less than medical certainty, and choosey in the wrong direction." Id.
In its Brief, Ortho argued that the Inman-Vessey Study, see note 53 and accompanying text
supra, had not established a statistically significant relationship between the level of estrogen
and the risk of stroke, emphasizing that in assessing the Inman-Vessey Study, the FDA had
concluded that the study had "inherent limitations." Brief for Appellant at 10, Brochu v. Or-
tho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981). Apparently, because the Brochu court
did not require plaintiffs to demonstrate a definite correlation, it found no need to directly ad-
dress this issue. The court, however, briefly reviewed the expert testimony that had averred to
the significance of the Inman-Vessey Study and concluded that the testimony was sufficient to
establish its credibility. Id. at 658-59.
74. See note 4 supra.
75. 642 F.2d at 657. The court analogized to the example of the Pasteur rabies vaccine in
Comment k. Id. See note 15 supra. The court stated that the example suggests that "certain
death is weighed against the high degree of risk posed by the [Pasteur] treatment itself." Id.
Comment k concludes with the statement that a manufacturer should not be liable for
marketing a drug "attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, § 402A, Comment k. It can be inferred from the use of the phrase "reasonable
risk" that Comment k leaves open the possibility that courts can make a determination of
reasonableness. In this regard, courts commonly determine the reasonableness of risks
associated with other products. See note 1 supra. But see text accompanying notes 106-23 in-
fra.
19811
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
true issue is acceptability of basic design." 76 That is, because the alleged
risk that created the duty to warn is precisely the same risk that may have
made the drug unreasonably dangerous, the jury should consider both
theories. However sound that logic may be, the implication is that the
design issue theoretically added nothing to the Brochu case. If the jury
found that the "extra" 50 mcg. of estrogen presented an increased risk,
then the warning issue alone would be dispositive of the case in the plain-
tiff's favor. On the other hand, to find that Novum 2 was defectively
designed, the jury would have had to find that not only did the "extra" 50
mcg. present an increased risk, but in addition that the risk was
unreasonably dangerous. In short, a finding of defective design required the
additional element of unreasonable danger." Because a finding of a defec-
tive design necessarily included a determination of the warning issue, the
Brochu court's finding of a design defect did not provide an alternative
ground of recovery.
By affirming recovery on grounds of design defect as well as warnings,
however, the Brochu court broke new ground in drug product liability.
Even if the design defect theory did not provide an alternative ground of
recovery in Brochu, the holding should spur rethinking of the restricted
bases of recovery in drug litigation. 78
THE IMPACT OF EXPANDING DRUG DESIGN LITIGATION
The obvious nature of the design defect in Brochu79 demonstrates that
prescription drugs are not necessarily unavoidably unsafe. Furthermore, an
76. 642 F.2d at 657 n.6 (citing Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 501). Pro-
fessor Twerski illustrates this idea with a case, McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322,
154 N.W.2d 488 (1967), involving a steam vaporizer that was tipped off a chair, causing hot
water to gush out and scald a young child. Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 501.
The decision for the plaintiff was grounded on two theories: (1) the design of the vaporizer
was unreasonably dangerous because it could have been fitted with a screw-on cap that would
have prevented the water from pouring out; and, (2) the manufacturer had failed to warn of
the danger of hot water pouring out when the vaporizer is tipped over. Professor Twerski then
suggests that the true issue in the case was the design, because an adequate warning of the risk
would have resembled the following: "This vaporizer when operating is filled with scalding hot
water-if this vaporizer is tipped, the water will pour out and one could be seriously injured or
killed-do not use in the vicinity of children." Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at
503. The author concludes that if this warning was attached to the product it would be un-
marketable, and, therefore, the true issue is design. Id. at 503-04. But see note 77 infra.
77. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1562-65 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hender-
son]. Professor Henderson contends that whenever both theories are presented to the jury, the
warning issue inevitably undercuts and displaces the design issue as the basis for determining
recovery. Id. at 1562. He explains that "the issue of unreasonable design is open-ended,
polycentric and relatively difficult, while, in contrast the issue of defendant's failure to warn is
focused and relatively easy." Therefore, he reasons, a jury truly bases liability on defective
design only if the jury also concludes that it was impossible for the manufacturer to warn the
plaintiff of the danger. Id. at 1563.
78. See notes 21-40 and accompanying text supra.
79. In 1977, the FDA mandated warnings that advised physicians that oral contraceptives
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analysis of the Brochu design defect holding reveals that, conceptually,
Comment k does not exempt drugs from a risk/utility balancing test.8" In-
deed, having willingly embraced this balancing test for other products, 8" it
appears quite logical for courts to apply it to drugs. There are practical
reasons, however, that should preclude courts from doing so.
The peculiar facts of the Brochu case conceal the impracticalities of ex-
tending the risk/utility balancing test to prescription drug litigation.
Because the 100 mcg. of estrogen offered no apparent advantages over
lower doses, Novum 1 provided an objective standard against which to
compare Novum 2.82 Consequently, the design defect claim centered upon a
mere factual dispute, the statistical risk of harm, rather than upon a
risk/utility assessment of design trade-offs. s3 This aspect of Brochu should
not, however, tempt other courts to expand product design litigation to en-
compass all types of drug cases. Unlike Brochu, the overwhelming majority
of prescription drug cases are likely to involve products for which there is
no objective standard of safety.84 Therefore, the effect of applying the
design defect theory to drugs can best be assessed in a context in which no
objective standard exists." That is, the impact of the Brochu holding must
be examined as it affects the cases in which a risk/utility balancing test
would truly be necessary.86
To demonstrate a prima facie design defect case, a plaintiff must prove
that a feasible alternative design would have reduced or eliminated the
injury-causing danger.87 Comparable products are commonly used to
demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed alternative.8 Expert testimony
containing amounts of estrogen greater than 50 mcg. should not be prescribed for contracep-
tive purposes. FDA CONSUMER, Feb. 1977, at 21. Ortho now warns physicians of the correla-
tion between risk of thromboembolism and higher doses of estrogen in oral contraceptives.
Brief for Appellant at 34 n.39, Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1981).
80. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
82. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d at 655 n.4. At trial, Ortho did
not controvert testimony that no matter the estrogen dosage, oral contraceptives were 99% ef-
fective. Id. Ortho did present some testimony that women using lower dose pills experienced a
higher degree of breakthrough bleeding, but that line of testimony was not extensively pursued.
Id.
83. Comparing Novum 2 to Novum I is akin to comparing a particular design to the in-
dustry custom. See Henderson, supra note 77, at 1556-57, 1571. That is, the "norm" of safety
provides an objective standard to which a product design can be compared. Id. at 1556. If the
safety is lower than the norm, it may be said to be defective. Id.
84. See notes 106-12 and accompanying text infra.
85. See notes 87-105 and accompanying text infra.
86. See notes 106-23 and accompanying text infra.
87. Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974).
88. See, e.g., Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967) (comparing safety
of other oil rigs); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578
(1974) (location of gas tank in station wagon compared to other designs); Ford Motor Co. v.
Havlick, 351 So. 2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Letts, J., dissenting) (location of
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provides the evidence utilized to determine whether the alternative product
would have presented less risk of the precise danger that caused the
injury.89
In many cases, however, evaluation of the harm-causing risk is not the
only consideration. The alternatives suggested 'may differ in efficiency,
usefulness, and cost, and may present dangers other than that which injured
the plaintiff.90 It then becomes necessary to evaluate the full range of design
trade-offs.9' The inability to meaningfully compare alternatives complicates
gas tank in Ford Pinto compared to foreign autos). See notes 45-46 and accompanying text
supra. Cf. Unmasking the Test, supra note 1, at 603 (the concept of defect is meaningful only
if compared to a similar product).
89. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 (3d Cir. 1976) (expert testimony required to deter-
mine defectiveness where product design is at issue). See Donaher, Piehler, Twerski and Wein-
stein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303 (1974).
According to the authors, the expert must address the following elements in a design defect
case:
(1) the identification of the design flaw or flaws that occasioned the injury; (2) the
enumeration of alternative design features proposed to reduce the danger; (3) the
evaluation of these features relative to the expected performance standards of the
product, as well as their effect upon the product's subsequent usefulness and cost;
(4) the comparison of this product with other similar products; and (5) the casual
link between the design deficiency and the injury.
Id. at 1310-11.
90. See, e.g., Olson v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.N.D. 1972) (rub-
ber track alternative on snowmobile could cause dangers other than that presented by metal
track); Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 115, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828, 831 (1977) (front
door hinging on Lincoln Continental would have prevented the injury but rear door hinging
provided easier ingress and egress); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 16, 484 P.2d
47, 57-58 (1971) (variation in hydraulic brake design could heighten other risks). See also
O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Act: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11
AKRON L. REV. 627, 637 (1978).
91. This type of evaluation has been described as involving the adjudication of conscious
design choices. See Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
See generally Henderson, supra note 77. This type of design case is distinguished from those
cases involving inadvertent design errors, wherein the product fails to meet the intended design
objective. Id. at 1542-52. For instance, when a roof collapses, e.g., Guffie v. Erie Strayer Co.,
350 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1965) (build-up of sand and rock on roof designed to hold the aggregate
caused it to collapse), or when a plane fails to fly, e.g., Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342
F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964) (overspeeding propeller caused the plane to crash), it can be said that
the actual design failed to meet the design objective. Moreover, in these cases the standard for
judicial determination of defectiveness, the intended design, is objective. These cases are
similar to manufacturing defect cases in which the product also failed to meet the design objec-
tive. See Henderson, supra note 77, at 1542-43.
On the other hand, where the case involves a conscious design choice, the issue of design
defect is subjective. See, e.g., Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971)
(claim that safer hydraulic brake design could have stopped the earth-mover more quickly and
possibly averted the accident not meritorious where evidence insufficient to establish that
another design was in fact safer). In Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234
(E.D. Pa. 1977), the plaintiff alleged that fuel tank on a Toronado could have been more safe-
ly located so as to prevent injury. The court recognized the subjective nature of determining
whether the design was unreasonably dangerous:
Where however, a conscious design choice has caused the injury, we are faced with
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the balancing process in many cases. In Dreisonstock v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G.," for example, the court rejected plaintiff's attempt to compare a
microbus to ordinary front-engine passenger cars.93 In so doing, the court
recognized that the rear-engine design that rendered the microbus less
crashworthy than an ordinary auto, was also responsible for allowing the
extra cargo space that made the vehicle unique and popular.94 Similarly, in
Seattle-First National Bank v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,95 the dissent
questioned the propriety of comparing the relatively inexpensive microbus
to higher-priced vehicles.96 Thus, Dreisonstock and Seattle-First National
Bank illustrate that in some instances no valid safety comparisons can be
made. Without an objective standard of safety, the question essentially posed
in such cases becomes "how much safety is enough?" 97 To answer this
open-ended question courts employ a risk/utility balancing test.98
quite a different problem; for there is no built-in objective standard by which the
jury can measure the alleged defect. This result stems, at least in part, from the
fact that a conscious design choice necessarily involves a trade-off among safety,
utility, and cost. The trade-off may be obvious and may also be acceptable to the
consumer. At the very least, it reflects the manufacturer's judgment of what would
be acceptable if the terms of the trade-off were publicly known. However, the pro-
cess of evaluating the trade-off, which represents the manufacturer's distillation of
the forces of the marketplace, is a sophisticated one which complicates the process
of products liability adjudication.
Id. at 241.
92. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
93. Id. at 1074-75. The passenger compartment had been unable to withstand a head on
crash at approximately 40 miles per hour. Id. at 1068. The plaintiff alleged that the front end
was insufficiently crashworthy to protect the passenger compartment. Id.
94. Id. at 1073-74.
95. 11 Wash. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286, modifying 11 Wash. App. 800 (1974), aff'd sub
nom. Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
96. 11 Wash. App. 929 at 935-36, 525 P.2d at 290 (Green, C.J., dissenting). Criticizing the
majority's judgment that the issue of reasonableness of the microbus design should be submit-
ted to the jury, the dissent stated: "The effect of this case, if universally applied, will be to
eliminate the less-expensive products from the market or drive up the price to cover losses....
Id. at 936, 525 P.2d at 290.
97. Henderson, supra note 77, at 1540; Reflections on Defective Products, supra note 3, at
811. Optimal safety, not maximum safety, is the goal of product design and, consequently,
products liability. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1056-58 (1972). According to the authors, the liability test should be
algebraically formulated "to minimize the sum of accident costs and the costs of accident
avoidance." Id. at 1057 (citing Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972)).
Professor Henderson, with the same idea in mind, states that the question of design liability is
resolved by answering the question: "What portion of society's limited resources are to be
allocated to safety, thereby leaving less to be devoted to other social objectives?" Henderson,
supra note 77, at 1540.
98. See note 3 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259,
1262-63 (3d Cir. 1977) (jury must balance trade-offs in adding a safety interlock that could
have prevented plaintiff's injury from dough-making machine); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534
F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1976) (probability and gravity of harm when an auto door latch opens
from collision must be weighed against cost of avoiding harm); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.
Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder Co. v. General Copper and Brass Co., 474
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Dreisonstock v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,99 exemplifies the frustration
courts encounter in subjectively determining a reasonable standard of safety.'0 0
Dreisonstock involved injuries sustained when a rear-engined microbus
travelling at forty miles per hour crashed head-on into a pole."" In finding
for the plaintiffs, the trial court had reasoned that a passenger compart-
ment should be able to withstand a collision at that speed."' 2 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, querying: "Does ordinary care de-
mand that the manufacturer provide against impacts at a speed of 40 miles
per hour? Is this the 'reasonable risk' as it has been defined? And why '40
miles per hour' anyway?""' 3 In concluding that the crashworthiness of the
microbus was legally sufficient, however, the appellate court was unable to
articulate its reasons for so holding any better than the trial court was able
to support its contrary result."'4 As demonstrated by the Dreisonstock deci-
F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (jury verdict for plaintiff proper where cost-benefit analysis of adding
guard to metal slitter was utilized).
Professor Wade has delineated seven risk-utility balancing factors:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the prod-
uct.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition
of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1975).
Professor Wade's approach has been extremely influential and has been explicitly adopted by a
number of courts. See, e.g., Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 463-64, 525 P.2d 125, 128
(1974); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 499 n.13, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 n.13
(1974).
99. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
100. See also Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 82, 268 N.W.2d 291, 295
(1978). The Owens court remarked that "[w]e are no longer on the frontier of products liability
litigation. The time has approached when we must begin to refine the role of the judiciary in
such controversies with deference to its limitations. ... Id.
101. 489 F.2d at 1068.
102. Id. at 1075.
103. Id.
104. The appeals court termed the trial court's standard as "improper," referring to the
comparison of the microbus to a more crashworthy ordinary front-engined passenger auto. Id.
at 1076. Nonetheless, the court could suggest no better alternative standard. Conversely, in
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of Amer., Inc., 11 Wash. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286
(1974), a case concerning a similar microbus, but where the accident occurred at a speed of only
20 miles per hour, the court concluded that the design issue should be submitted to the jury.
Id. at 935, 525 P.2d at 290.
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sion, where a comparative norm of safety is absent, the subjective court-
imposed standard is unavoidably arbitrary." 5
The typical drug design defect case, unlike Brochu, would resemble these
cases in which the lack of an objective standard is manifest. The physician
is nearly always faced with a selection of drugs in which safety is but one of
several variables considered in choosing the appropriate prescription. 0 6 In
Fritz v. Parke Davis & Co.,' °7 for example, a physician selected Dilantin,
one of five drugs available, to treat epilepsy.' 0 When the patient subse-
quently died from an adverse reaction to the drug, the plaintiffs brought
suit against the manufacturer and physician claiming the Dilantin was
unreasonably dangerous as designed, and that the physician was negligent in
prescribing the drug.'0 9 The plaintiff's assertions were supported by expert
testimony that two alternative drugs for treating epilepsy were preferable
because they contained fewer side effects. ' 0 Other experts contradicted this
105. See generally Henderson, supra note 77. Professor Henderson maintains that courts are
incapable of responsibly adjudicating conscious product designs unless they rely upon extra-
judicially established standards. Id. at 1534. He concludes that such adjudication unavoidably
results in arbitrary verdicts. Id. at 1558.
Assuming the validity of the hypothesis that adjudication is unsuited to answering
the question of "How much design safety is enough?," it follows that a broad-
scale judicial commitment to the independent review of conscious design choices
would bring with it a very real threat to the integrity of the judicial process. Con-
fronted with the hopeless difficulties of trying to redesign products via adjudica-
tion, and presumably unable to resist the social pressures generally favoring injured
plaintiffs, courts would inevitably resort to some form of judicial coin-flipping,
i.e., they would begin to determine defendants' liability on some arbitrary basis
rather than on the purported basis of the reasonableness of the product designs
brought before them. Efforts to establish meaningful design standards would be
abandoned in favor of allowing juries to determine defendants' liability upon no
more substantial grounds than their own untutored "good judgment," or whim.
The shift in the basis of manufacturers' liability would be disguised, consciously or
otherwise, by heavy reliance upon the unsupported opinions of experts relating to
the ultimate issue of the reasonableness of defendants' conscious design choices.
The absence of any viable product safety standards with which to decide these
cases, however, would be obvious even to the casual observer. In effect, the ad-
judicative process would largely become a sham. Although such tactics might
render these cases manageable in the short run, they would do so at the cost of a
serious erosion of confidence in the courts by those litigants who would correctly
come to realize that they have been denied effective access to the adjudicative pro-
cess by such subterfuge.
Id. at 1558.
106. A physician, of course, can be liable for selecting the wrong drug for treatment of an
illness, e.g., Rotan v. Greenbaum, 273 F.2d 830 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (administered penicillin
which was ineffective for treatment of mumps); or prescribing doses too large for the illness,
e.g., Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C. 366, 758 S.E.2d 555 (1968) (administering an adult drug to a
child).
107. 277 Minn. 210, 152 N.W.2d 129 (1967).
108. Id. at 212, 152 N.W.2d at 130-31.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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testimony, however, stating that they preferred Dilantin.'" The Minnesota
Appellate Court affirmed the directed verdict for the manufacturer and the
physician, holding that the widespread use of Dilantin by physicians con-
clusively established the reasonableness of its safety.'2
Significantly, according to modern products liability law the design issue
in Fritz should have been submitted to the jury for resolution. Contrary to
the Fritz holding, widespread usage does not establish the reasonableness of
a design. ' 3 Instead, a conflict in expert testimony, such as that in Fritz,
creates a jury issue." 4 In Huddell v. Levin, ' 5 for example, although the
court expressed skepticism of plaintiff's expert testimony that a headrest
was defectively designed, it was held that the issue should be resolved by
the trier of fact.'' 6 In the court's view, because public policy requires liberal
11l. Id.
112. Id. at 213, 152 N.W.2d at 131. If the drug manufacturer misleads the physician into
prescribing a drug for an ailment when less dangerous drugs are available, the manufacturer
may be liable. See Bristol-Myers v. Gonzale§, 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). In Gon-
zales the manufacturer had indicated in the warnings that Kantrex could be used for irrigating
wounds. Id. at 424. The warnings did not indicate, however, that the drug was nbt proper for
continuous irrigation. Id. Relying on the manufacturer's recommendations, the physician used
Kantrex for continuous irrigation in treating the patient's injury, and the patient subsequently
suffered loss of hearing from the toxic effects of the drug. Id. at 422. Based on testimony that
less toxic drugs were available for continuous treatment, the manufacturer was held liable for
inadequately warning physicians. Id. at 424.
113. See, e.g., Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Garner, 547 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Ark. 1977) (usage
does not make an inherently dangerous practice reasonably safe); Badorek v. General Motors
Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d 447, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 327-28 (1970) (industry norm is not
conclusive); Gilbert v. Stone City Constr. Co., 357 N.E.2d 738, 745 (Ind. App. 1976) (stand-
ards of an entire industry may be negligently low); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502
S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. 1973) (industry "cannot be permitted to set its own uncontrolled stand
ard[s]"); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (stand-
ards of an entire industry may be negligently low). But see Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83
Mich. App. 74, 81, 268 N.W.2d 291, 295 (1978) (design not defective unless it fails to conform
to industry standard or government regulation).
114. See, e.g., Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (3d Cir. 1977) (judge erred in
directing a verdict for the manufacturer where conflicting testimony existed); Melia v. Ford
Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 798-99 (8th Cir. 1976) (jury must resolve design issue from conflic-
ting testimony); Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1976)
(reasonable minds can draw differing conclusions from conflicting evidence); Nanda v. Ford
Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 220 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff demonstrates prima facie case where
expert testifies as to unreasonableness of design); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App.
3d 1, 6, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1974) (conflict in expert testimony is sufficient to create a
jury issue). But see Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971). In Garst,
the plaintiff argued that an improved steering system on an 80-ton earth-moving scraper could
have provided sufficient maneuverability so that the accident that injured the plaintiff could
have been avoided. Id. at 14, 484 P.2d at 56. The plaintiff's expert proposed three alternative
designs. Id. The appellate court, doubting the feasibility of the alternatives, reversed the jury
verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 23, 484 P.2d at 62-63. The dissent admonished the majority for
ignoring the rule that a conflict in expert testimony creates a jury issue. Id. at 24, 484 P.2d at
63-64 (Fatzer, J., dissenting).
115. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
116. Id. at 735-37.
19811 BROCHU
treatment of an expert's opinion, the jury must determine the credibility of
expert testimony. '7
Because Ortho did not challenge the evidentiary basis of the design defect
claim,' 8 the Brochu court did not need to address the infirmities of this
policy as applied to drugs. In any event, this policy would necessarily apply
to drug design issues because there is no means of limiting its application. ' 9
The liberal policy is the natural result of courts' inability to articulate an ob-
jective standard by which to determine whether a design defect claim has
sufficient merit to warrant submission to the jury. 20
Applied to drugs, the potentially disastrous results of this liberal policy
are apparent. Despite the advantages a drug may possess, if an available
alternative exists that poses less risk of a particular injury, under a design
defect theory the claim would warrant submission to the jury regardless of
its merits. 2 ' Absent any standard by which to judge the reasonableness of a
117. Id. at 737.
118. Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d at 655.
119. See Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1175 (D.R.I. 1975). In Oresman, the
trial court concluded, without discussion, that "there was sufficient evidence for the submis-
sion to the jury for its determination [on] the issue of whether defendant's [oral contraceptives]
were in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer .... I d. at
1180-81. The court gave no indication of the nature of evidence that was "sufficient." It can
be concluded that the evidence in Oresman was not similar to that proffered in Brochu regard-
ing the extra risk posed by the 100 mcg. pill. The plaintiff in Oresman incurred her injury in
1968, before the Inman-Vessey Study suggested the link between dosage levels of estrogen and
increased risk of stroke.
In any event, it is likely that the judge in Oresman was willing to extend the liberal policy to
drugs. In an earlier opinion, the court ruled that res ipsa loquitur should apply so that
negligence could be inferred from the fact that the injury resulted from the ingestion of the
oral contraceptives. See Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449, 454-55 (D.R.I.
1971) (denying summary judgment for defendant). Applying res ipsa loquitur to such a situa-
tion is strikingly similar to the imposition of absolute liability. Not surprisingly, the jury
ultimately rendered a verdict of $500,000 for the plaintiff. See Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
388 F. Supp. 1175, 1181 (D.R.I. 1975) (denying manufacturer's request for judgment n.o.v.).
120. See note 105 supra. See also Search for Middle Ground, supra note 1, at 651. Professor
Epstein concludes that by virtue of this policy, and by isolating the harm-causing feature of a
product, nearly any product-related injury is actionable. Id. In addition, he contends that the
more complicated a product, the more defects that can be invented. Id. Indeed, at least one
court has affirmatively stated that to create a jury issue, the plaintiff need only demonstrate
that the product proximately caused the injury. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,
431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). If the plaintiff can demonstrate prox-
imate cause, the court held, the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that the product
is not defectively designed. Id.
121. A hypothetical example could involve an IUD. A woman whose IUD causes a pelvic in-
fection (a side effect of the IUD) could correctly claim that the injury would not have occurred
had she used an alternative method of birth control, such as an oral contraceptive. Although
she was fully informed of risks of the IUD, a prima facie design case would be established
with expert testimony stating that the IUD was unreasonably dangerous because safer
substitutes were available. The defense would argue that the widespread use of the IUD is con-
clusive evidence as to the reasonableness of design. In accord with prevailing products liability
doctrine, this defense would be rejected. See note 113 and accompanying text supra. Conse-
quently, based on plaintiff's expert testimony, the case should be submitted to the jury. See
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drug's design, and in light of the financial burdens caused by drug injuries,
it is probable that juries will arbitrarily afford recovery in many cases. '22
Regardless of the conceptual soundness of inferring a risk/utility balancing
test from Comment k, the practical effect is to accord drugs the same status
as other products, thereby destroying the Comment k exception.' 23
THE POLICY ARGUMENTS
Both courts and commentators recognize the problems that pervade sub-
jective design litigation. They maintain, however, that despite the sometimes
arbitrary results, there are overriding policy reasons that justify judicial
scrutiny of product designs. 2 " One policy goal, enhanced product safety, is
notes 113-17 and accompanying text supra. The jury could conceivably render a verdict for the
plaintiff, purportedly on the ground that an IUD is unreasonably dangerous. Yet many women
prefer the IUD over other methods of contraception because of its convenience. See Con-
traception: Comparing the Options, 11 FDA CONSUMER, July-August, 7, 9 (1977).
122. The determining factor in many products liability cases may be sympathy for the plain-
tiff. See Strause & Hedden, Liability for Product Design in Ohio-A First Step Toward Solu-
tion, 11 AKRON L. REV. 663, 670 (1978). The authors attribute this to the lack of an objective
standard. Id. Where the jury has no standard for determining the reasonableness of design, it
may instead rely on the ability of the manufacturer to absorb the loss. See note 105 supra.
Another commentator ascribes the propensity to favor plaintiffs to the manner in which the
trial is conducted. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interac-
tion of Law and Technology, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 425, 445 (1974) (focus of the trial on the
injury-causing feature of the product creates a strong inference that the product is
unreasonably dangerous). Moreover, these authors insist that "[i]f the only input the jury has
provided for its consideration is two conflicting expert opinions without the supporting reason-
ing processes .... the jury is in no position to intelligently choose between them." Id. at 438.
One commentator concludes that the modern standardless design litigation results in a
"glorious" and "expensive game of chance." Search for Middle Ground, supra note 1, at 652.
Perhaps the most pristine example of a jury finding a manufacturer liable in an improbable
situation is Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975) (failure to warn of col-
ogne's flammability where plaintiff for fun poured cologne on a candle, causing the candle to
flame up and scorch the girl's neck and breasts).
123. Oresman v. G.D. Searle & Co., 321 F. Supp. 449 (D.R.I. 1971) (denying summary
judgment for the manufacturer), illustrates this result. In Oresman, the defendant contended
that oral contraceptives are unavoidably unsafe products and are, therefore, protected by Com-
ment k. The court ruled that it would reserve judgment on the matter until the trial progressed
further. Id. at 457. Apparently, the court decided that the jury should determine the issues of
whether the oral contraceptive was unavoidably unsafe and whether it was unreasonably
dangerous. In subsequent case development, the same judge found that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant the jury conclusion that the oral contraceptive was unreasonably
dangerous. In so doing, the judge made no mention of Comment k. See Oresman v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 388 F. Supp. 1175 (D.R.I. 1975) (denying manufacturer's request for judgment
n.o.v.).
124. See, e.g., Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(1974) (design litigation may freeze product innovation but it is necessary to promote safe
designs); Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra note 1, at 539-40 (after criticizing design litiga-
tion, authors conclude that there is no alternative to judicial review of conscious design choices
if societal goals are to be met). In contrast, several courts have concluded that an objective
standard, such as custom of the industry or government standards, must be employed to
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furthered by increasing the potential liability of manufacturers.' 25
Moreover, even if liability is sometimes imposed capriciously, the manufac-
turer is in a better position than the individual to absorb the loss and
spread the costs resulting from product-related injuries.' ,6 These justifica-
tions undoubtedly apply with equal force to prescription drug products.'27
The underlying presumption that compels courts to set safety standards,
however, does not apply to prescription drugs.
Consumers, it is presumed, are often unable to adequately assess a pro-
duct's risks.'28 This inability occurs when a product's risks are hidden and
reduce the subjectivity in design litigation. See, e.g., Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich.
App. 74, 81, 268 N.W.2d 291, 295 (1978); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,
326-27, 364 N.E.2d 267, 273 (1977).
125. See Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (1974)
(prospect of liability keeps designers "on their toes"); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa.
547, 553, 391 A.2d 1020, 1023 (1978) (policy puts burden on manufacturers to guarantee pro-
duct safety). See Reflections on Defective Products, supra note 3, at 381 (authors argue that
"[tihe removal of large categories of design cases totally from judicial scrutiny would relieve
many manufacturers of any legal obligation whatsoever to design reasonably safe products and
thereby obviate an important incentive for the development and improvement of safety stan-
dards in industry as a whole.") But see note 97 supra.
For a comprehensive list of proffered justifications for products liability, see Brandenburger
v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 514-15, 513 P.2d 268, 273 (1973). For
scholarly evaluations of the goals of product liability, see Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); McKean, Products Liability: Trends and
Implications, 38 U. C-i. L. REv. 3 (1970); Owen, Rethinking the Policies for Strict Products
Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980).
126. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment c (manufacturer is the proper party
to afford protection and absorb risks). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). The Greenman court stated "[t]he purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
701. Accord, Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178,
182 (1970) (manufacturers' liability can spread risks throughout society).
This "deep pocket" rationale has been harshly condemned. See Unmasking the Test, supra
note 1, at 643. The author argues that "[tihe time has come to ask candidly whether some
courts, in their eagerness to provide recovery for injured plaintiffs, have not overzealously em-
phasized and relied upon the risk-spreading rationale of strict products liability .. " Id. An
example of this "overzealous emphasis" is apparent in Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 65
Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 134 Cal. Rptr. 895, 902 (1976), where the court stated that "[t]o deny
the plaintiff the benefit of the inference of proximate cause would frustrate that [loss-
spreading] policy." Professor Epstein recognized the limits of the court's logic when he noted
that "[o]ne might as well say that any judgment for the defendant frustrates that policy."
Search for Middle Ground, supra note I, at 659-60.
127. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 IlI. 2d 26, 31, 402 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1980) (if
strict product liability applies to food products and tractors, it certainly applies to drugs).
128. See Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64, 71 (1970) (im-
petus for strict liability is inability of consumers to rationally judge quality of complex
technological products and to compensate third parties); Henderson, supra note 77 at 1562-67
("marketplace negotiation breakdown" accounts for entry of judiciary into safety standard-
setting); Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 399
(1970) ("the underlying basis for the conclusion . . . that a product is defective and
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warnings are impossible, impractical, or ineffective, as is typically the case
with highly technological products.' 29 If it is impossible to warn of risks,
thereby exposing unwitting consumers to a product's hidden dangers, the
only way to ensure that the consumer can choose a reasonably safe product
is to demand a safe design. Courts, therefore, intervene to establish product
safety standards, albeit on a case-by-case basis.' 30
Because prescription drugs are extremely complex products, they are
often comprised of hidden dangers and uncertain benefits. 3 ' It is precisely
because of the vagaries of prescription drugs that the physician is positioned
between the manufacturer and the consumer.'32 The duty of the "learned
intermediary" is to consciously weigh the therapeutic value of available
alternatives against their potential side effects.'33 Because the physician per-
forms this risk assessment, the drug consumer is not helplessly exposed to
product dangers. Accordingly, the justification for adjudicating product
designs-consumers' inability to assess risks-is therefore inapplicable to
prescription drug products.' 34
unreasonably dangerous is the ignorance of the user about the dangerous characteristics of the
product").
129. It is significant that the seminal case holding a manufacturer (other than food
manufacturers, etc.) liable for implied warranty of merchantability was justified based on the
inability of consumers to adequately assess complex modern products. See Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 375, 161 A.2d 69, 78 (1960) (consumer cannot decide
for himself whether autos are reasonably fit for the designed purpose). Similarly, in the
seminal strict liability case, the court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (emphasis
supplied).
There are instances where the plaintiff could not know of the danger and it would be im-
possible to warn of the danger. See, e.g., Long v. Burdette Mfg. Co., 460 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.
1972) (plaintiff's heel cut on unnecessary sharp edge of bottom shelf of library cart);
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff passenger on
motorcycle injured when her leg came into contact with unshielded metal flanges protruding
from car manufactured by defendant).
130. One scholar explains that courts feel peculiarly compelled to adjudicate design safety of
heavy industrial equipment, autos, and power lawn mowers. He estimates that these categories
account for 80% of design defect cases, because in these cases injured parties are particularly
unsuited to avoiding risks associated with those products. See Henderson, supra note 77 at
1565-66.
131. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[plrescription
drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect").
132. See note 24 supra.
133. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Wolfgruber v. Up-
john Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 61, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (1979). The Reyes court explained that it is
precisely because prescription drugs are complex that the physician's presence is necessary. 498
F.2d at 1276. The physician's task is "weighing the benefits of any medication against its
potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judg-
ment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative." Id.
134. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 402A, Comment k. "[A] [drug] product . . . accom-
panied by proper directions and warning is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
Id. (emphasis in original).
1981] BROCHU
Moreover, even without the advantage of the design defect theory, a drug
consumer that is needlessly exposed to excessive dangers will not be left
without a legal remedy. The physician is legally obligated to ensure that pa-
tients are shielded from unnecessary risks.' 35 The presence of the physician
enables manufacturers to communicate remote or suspected risks. In short,
if a risk is identifiable, a duty to warn arises.' 36 Thus, if the physician does
not adequately assess the risks associated with a drug, it is either because he
was negligent in performing his duty'37 or because the manufacturer failed
to inform him of the risks. 3 '
This dual rationale was illustrated in Gaston v. Hunter.'3' In that case,
the manufacturer had informed physicians of the experimental nature of a
drug.' 40 When injury resulted from the administration of the drug, the pa-
tient sued the manufacturer, alleging that the drug was defectively designed
and that the warnings issued were inadequate.'' Claiming that the drug was
not suited to her condition, the plaintiff also contended that the physicians
had negligently failed to follow the warnings regarding the type of patient
135. See note 137 and accompanying text infra.
136. See Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 151 (Mo. 1967) (differentiating duty
to warn for drugs from that required for cosmetics because physician's presence allows
manufacturers to warn of idiosyncratic drug reactions to prescription drugs). See cases cited in
note 22 supra.
137. See, e.g., Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 111. 2d 411, 418, 303 N.E.2d
392, 396 (1973) (physician's deviation from manufacturer's recommendations constitutes a
prima facie case of negligence); Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 143, 167 A.2d 625, 633
(1961) (dentist "who knows a drug is potentially harmful to a certain type of patient should
take adequate precaution before . . . deciding whether to administer [the drug]"); Op-
penheimer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103, 108-09, 219 N.E.2d 54, 58-59 (1964)
(doctor who failed to read warnings that would have alerted him to side effects was negligent).
138. See notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, as Brochu illustrates,
manufacturers have demonstrated a propensity for failing to warn of risks that render drugs
unreasonably dangerous. See Brief for Appellee at 23-24, Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981). The plaintiff alleged that Ortho withheld information of
the increased risk from Novum 2 for fear that releasing it would dent sales. Id. See also Tin-
nerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 411 F.2d 48
(2d Cir. 1969) (marketed drug without warnings although reports indicated substantially in-
creased risks); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 695-96, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 404 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (failed to warn of various reactions despite massive test findings);
Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 148-49 (Mo. 1967) (failed to warn despite
medical studies and doctor reports indicating drug could cause cataracts). Each of the above-
cited cases was tried on the adequacy of warning issue as well as an alternative ground.
In discussing the relationship between the defective design and warnings issue, the court in
Larsen v. General Motors Corps., remarked 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968): "Admittedly, [the
manufacturer] would not sell many cars of this particular model if its sales 'pitch' included the
cautionary statement that the user is subjected to an extra hazard or unreasonable risk in the
event of a head-on collision." Id. at 506.
139. 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1978).
140. Id. at 47, 588 P.2d at 340. Also, the plaintiff had signed a consent form stating that
she was aware of the investigational nature of the drug. Id. at 38, 588 P.2d at 331.
141. Id. at 38, 588 P.2d at 331.
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for whom the drug was appropriate.' 2 The court noted that if this conten-
tion was valid, the physicians would be liable, but the claim against the
manufacturer would be barred.' 4  Alternatively, the court pointed out that
if the warnings had been inadequate, the manufacturer would be held
liable.14 4 Under either alternative, even if the drug administered was
unreasonably dangerous, the plaintiff would have legal recourse without
resorting to the design defect theory. Consequently, in prescription drug
cases, the design defect theory adds no significant weapon to plaintiffs'
legal arsenal.
CONCLUSION
By taking the stance that a drug manufacturer may be held strictly liable
based upon a claim of defective drug design, regardless of the warnings, the
Brochu decision purports to extend to plaintiffs an alternative ground of
recovery. Although Brochu represents the first circuit court decision apply-
ing the design defect theory to prescription drugs, the court's inference of a
risk/utility balancing test from Comment k is conceptually sound. The
soundness of this reference reflects, however, that the facts in Brochu were
peculiarly susceptible to the application of that rationale.
In contrast to Brochu, the overwhelming majority of drug cases involve
products for which there is no "norm" of safety. Applying the design
defect theory to those cases would allow drug-related injuries to become
presumptively actionable, and, in effect, would abolish the policy role of
Comment k. Furthermore, because of the presence of the physician, the
presumption that underlies design litigation-the inability of consumers to
assess risks-does not apply to prescription drug products. Finally, the
distinctive ability of prescription drug manufacturers to warn of risks
renders adjudication of drug designs unnecessary. The prescription drug
user who is subjected to unwarranted dangers will find an adequate ground
of legal relief either through negligence of the physician, or through the
manufacturer's failure to adequately warn. In short, if application of the
design defect theory to drugs is unnecessary, and would engender largely ar-




143. Id. at 45 n.9, 588 P.2d at 338 n.9.
144. Id. at 47, 588 P.2d at 340. In some situations, however, both the physician and the
manufacturer may be liable. For example, in Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206
(1971), the physicians were held liable for indiscriminately prescribing a drug, and the
manufacturer was held liable for its overpromotion of the drug that contributed to the physi-
cians' carefree use of it. Id. at 282, 288-89, 282 A.2d at 217, 220.
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